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We know that the official attitude toward terrorism suffers from a suspension of 
any inquiry into causation. Government officials seldom ask what causes terror, or 
question their own participation in terrorist acts. Somehow, one gets the feeling that there 
is no connection between terrorism and its root causes. This chapter will challenge that 
sentiment and provide an example of causation. Perpetrators of terror are not simply born 
with some terrorist disease. Instead, specific conditions drive them into it. It is 
appropriate now to take a look at a prominent case where violence is a reaction to such 
circumstances.  
          
Palestinian Violence: Causes and Consequences 
 
While Palestinian resistance is generally seen as a reaction to the creation of the 
State of Israel in 1948, its causes have deep roots at many levels. First, it is a response to 
Zionist colonization of Palestine. Second, it is driven by psychological motivation to 
recover lost rights. Third and, perhaps most important, Palestinian resistance took root in 
the absence of meaningful peaceful channels for legitimate change. If Palestinians were 
given peaceful means for achieving justice, they were, and are not likely to feel the need 
for revolutionary resistance.  
 
It is, therefore, the unique circumstances that the Palestinian Arabs have faced 
which molded them into the culture of resistance through a variety of methods. The 
highlight of their resistance was the 1987-1993 Intifada (uprising) and the second Intifada 
that started in 2000. But the Intifada was not a transitory phenomenon that sprang up 
from nowhere. Rather, the Intifada represented the acceleration of an ongoing process of 
resistance. It, then, reflected continuity as it did innovation in the long struggle of the 
Palestinian Arabs in their quest for justice and independence.  
 
Palestinian Resistance: Historical Background 
 
The rise of Arab nationalism in Palestine paralleled its development among other 
Arabs. With the defeat of the Ottoman Empire at the hands of the Allied forces in 1918, 
Arab expectations of independence and unity were high. After the 1918 armistice, the 
Arabs came to be aware of the conflicting promises and felt a deep sense of betrayal. 
 
The year 1917 marked a turning point in the history of Palestine – as the 
globalization of the Palestinian-Jewish conflict incorporated an outside colonial power. 
This year witnessed the issuance of the Balfour Declaration and the beginning of British 
rule. In December 1917, General Allenby’s forces entered Jerusalem and set up a British 
military administration in Palestine. On the basis of previous British promises, the Arabs 
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of Palestine welcomed Allenby as a liberator, hoping that they would soon attain 
independence within a larger Arab state. These hopes were soon dashed, as the British 
began working on a program to place Palestine under their mandate. Moreover, the 
Balfour Declaration, promising British support for the creation of a “Jewish National 
Home” in Palestine, was incorporated into the mandate resolution of the League of 
Nations in 1922.  
 
Arab nationalism in Palestine was now rapidly taking shape in response to British 
rule and Zionist plans for their homeland. By the 1930’s, their resistance manifested itself 
in organized political and armed activities. During this decade, Palestinian Arabs 
witnessed the emergence of their earliest guerilla groups. Also, a number of political 
parties were formed. These parties – regardless of loyalty or ideology – all advocated 
national independence and opposed political Zionism, which aimed at creating a Jewish 
state in Palestine.  
 
It was during the 1930’s that the notion of popular armed struggle emerged in 
Palestine. One of the earliest such groups was the movement of Shaykh Izz el-Din al-
Qassam. Qassam was able to mobilize a peasant following and train them in the use of 
arms. He advocated Arab unity and independence for Palestine. Qassam also vowed to 
wage armed struggle against the British and the Zionists. Qassam’s very first act of 
violence included the tossing a hand grenade on a Jewish home in the Nahalal colony in 
December 1932. 1 But before he could get his revolt going, the British ambushed Qassam 
and a dozen of his followers. Instead of surrendering or escaping, Qassam fought to the 
end. He and some of his followers were killed in battle on November 19, 1935. 
 
Qassam’s death made him a symbol of self-sacrifice and martyrdom, contributing 
to the spread of his ideals across the country. It was his followers who actually began the 
campaign of armed struggle and organized, with others, the famous Arab Revolt of 1936. 
That revolt represented the climax of Palestinian resistance during the mandate. It lasted 
until 1939 and was seen by the British as a major revolution to be suppressed. It is 
estimated that 5,000 Palestinians were brutally killed by British forces and Zionist 
militias during this period. 2 British behavior often bordered on terrorism. For example, 
in May 1936, the British authorities carried out heavy punitive measures including 
demolishing a large section of the most significant Arab city, Jaffa. Residents lost their 
homes and properties in this massive form of collective punishment. In the same year, the 
British also began detaining suspects, mostly civilians, without trial. 3 While the revolt 
officially ended in 1939, violence persisted. 
 
As Europe was self-destructing during World War II, Palestine was feeling the 
ramifications of European activities. New waves of immigrants, legal and illegal, were 
arriving in the country to escape Nazi terror. The Zionist enterprise, moreover, gained 
further international support and was solidified in the face of Hitler’s plans for the Jews 
of Europe. In Palestine, Zionist violence grew to new heights and effectively divided the 
country into Jewish and Arab domains. In September 1944, for example, many attacks 
took place. On September 27 alone, four attacks on police stations took place killing and 
injuring many innocent people. Two days later, an expert on Jewish affairs, was 
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murdered by a group called “Fighters for the Freedom of Israel.” In October of the same 
year, many attacks were made on the Palestine railway system where many railway 
employees were killed. On November 6, of the same year, Lord Moyne and his British 
driver were assassinated by the same group. 4 
 
The violence continued unabated after the end of World War II. In 1947, the 
British Government announced, after many attempts at a solution, that “the mandate has 
proved to be unworkable in practice, and that the obligations undertaken to the two 
communities have shown to be irreconcilable. 5 By this time, the conflict between Arabs 
and Zionists had truly become irreconcilable. Palestine’s Jewish population had reached 
thirty percent and had become a formidable force in the country.  
 
It was at this juncture that the United Nations began to play an important part in 
the globalization of the Palestinian-Zionist conflict. The General Assembly delegated a 
special committee to travel to Palestine and investigate the situation. The report 
submitted by this U.N. Special Commission on Palestine (UNSCOP) incorporated two 
proposed plans: Partition and Federation. The majority of UNSCOP members favored the 
first plan to partition the country into two states – Jewish and Palestinian Arab. The 
minority of UNSCOP members favored a federal state in Palestine. To insure the passage 
of the majority plan, Zionist pressures were applied inside and outside the U.N. As 
President Truman of the United States confirmed, “So much lobbying and outside 
interference has been going on in this question [the partition plan] that it is almost 
impossible to get a fair-minded approach to the subject.” 6 Later Truman reminisced:  
 
As the pressure mounted, I found it necessary to give instructions that I did not want to be 
approached by any more spokesmen for the extreme Zionist cause. 7 
 
The Arabs of Palestine did not have the means to counteract the Zionist lobbying 
activities in the United States or other countries. In the U.S., politicians found it 
expedient to capitalize on Jewish concerns about the Nazi victims. The Arabs had no 
such appeal. Moreover, the Zionists had the necessary organizational infrastructures in 
the U.S., while the Arabs had none. In addition, many Americans viewed the notion of a 
Jewish state in Palestine as a fulfillment of biblical prophecies. Thus, on November 29, 
1947, the General Assembly adopted the partition plan.  
 
According to this plan, Palestine was to be divided into six parts-three of which 
(fifty-six percent of the total area) were to become a Jewish state, and the other three 
(forty-three percent) were to become an Arab state. Jerusalem and surrounding areas 
were to fall under U.N. administration. This resolution meant that the Jewish state would 
include 498,000 Jews and 497,000 Arabs (excluding the nomadic inhabitants of the 
Negev), and the Arab state would include 725,000 Arabs and 10,000 Jews.  
 
The Palestinian leadership rejected the partition resolution. They argued that it 
violated the provisions of the U.N. Charter on self determination. The Palestinian 
rejection also was based on demographic and legal ownership facts. In the proposed 
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Jewish state, half the population was to be Palestinian-Arab while its Jewish population 
owned less than ten percent of its total land area. 
 
The Creation of Israel 
 
The reaction to the partition resolution among the Palestinians resulted in a wave 
of protests, demonstrations and disturbances throughout Palestine. Soon after the 
adoption of the resolution, British forces began to withdraw from specific areas. Both 
Arabs and Zionists attempted to gain control of those areas, leading to attacks on local 
inhabitants. For example, on the night of December 18, 1947, vehicles loaded with armed 
Jewish men from the nearby settlements of Dan and Dasne attacked the Arab village of 
Khisas. The attackers threw grenades at the homes of the sleeping residents and withdrew 
killing ten, including children, and wounding five. (Ibid, p. 153). 8 As historian Edgar 
O’Balance testified, “it was the Jewish policy to encourage the Arabs to quit their 
homes,” and “they ejected those who clung to their villages.” 9 Other Arabs, according to 
Sir John Bagot Glubb, were “encouraged to move by blows or by indecent acts.” 10 
Ethnic purification was so important to Zionist planners because of the demographic 
factors involved. Given that Jews were less than thirty percent of the population of all 
Palestine, and a mere fifty percent in their allocated Jewish state – and given the high 
birth rate among the Arabs – it was imperative to ride their forthcoming state of as many 
Arabs as possible. Otherwise, the Jewish state would have an Arab majority in a very 
short time.  
 
Confronted with the tragic situation in Palestine, the leading champion of 
partition, the United States, began to have second thoughts. Consequently, the U.S. 
submitted an alternative proposal to the U.N. Security Council on March 19, 1948. It 
proposed a temporary U.N. trusteeship over all of Palestine.  
 
As the United Nations was reexamining the question of Palestine, Zionist planners 
were busy establishing their authority on the land of Palestine. As Dr. Chaim Weizmann, 
president of the World Zionist Organization reminisced: “Our only chance now…was to 
create facts, to confront the world with these facts, and to build on their foundation.” 
Later, he was able to proclaim that, “while the United Nations was debating trusteeship, 
the Jewish state was coming into being. 11 The most frequently mentioned incident 
among the many contributing to a panic flight of the Palestinian inhabitants was the 
terrorist massacre of Deir Yassin. On April 9, 1948, 254 men, women, and children in the 
village of Deir Yassin were massacred by Irgun attackers. The Irgun was a militant 
Zionist group led by Menachem Begin, who became Israel’s Prime Minister in 1977. 
Under British rule in Palestine, Begin was a wanted terrorist. His group, the Irgun, 
committed hundreds of acts of violence targeting both civilian and public sites. The Irgun 
also involved itself in assassinations and sabotage. Such incidents contributed to a 
massive exodus of the Palestinian Arab population and opened the door for the creation 
of the Jewish state. Short of this Arab exodus, the Jewish state would have been 
demographically more Arab than Jewish. 
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The State of Israel was proclaimed in mid-May, 1948. This newly born state 
incorporated not only the area specified to it in the partition resolution, but an enlarged 
area it had just occupied. It was at this juncture that the Arabization of the Palestine 
conflict occurred. Prior to the establishment of Israel, volunteers and donations, besides 
diplomatic moves, characterized Arab involvement. But after the declaration of Israel and 
the mass exodus of Palestinians into neighboring Arab countries, that the Arab armies 
entered Palestine. But the Arab offensive was weak and lacked coordination and 
leadership. The Israelis, on the other hand, were better prepared in terms of unity, 
organization, leadership, and sophistication. Even their numbers exceeded those of the 
Arab armies. They soon were on the offensive and were able to arrange for armistice 
agreements – Israel had gained more territory (almost eighty percent of the land of former 
Palestine). Jordan took control of the remaining part of Palestine including the old city of 
Jerusalem with the exception of the Gaza district, which went to Egyptian control. 
 
Thus, a Jewish state was established in Palestine. The Palestinian Arabs were left 
without a state and for the majority of them, even without homes. Their country was 
transformed into a state for others. The loss of the land of the forefathers and their 
refugee status left the Palestinians in a perpetual state of shock. In their memories, 1948 
stands as the year of Nakba (tragedy). Ever since, the notion of the return to the homeland 
became a Palestinian obsession.  
 
Therefore, Palestinian political culture began to center on rejection: the rejection 
of their disinheritance as well as the rejection of the status quo. It was in this context that 
Palestinian political culture became a culture of resistance and rebellion. Their resistance 
evolved through four distinct phases. Initially, the Palestinians resisted the existing Arab 
order. Their activists and intellectuals attempted to redirect the Arab system toward a 
more progressive and nationalist order. The failure of the new Arab order, as exemplified 
in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, led the Palestinians towards a more independent form of 
resistance. They began a campaign of armed, and in many cases, terrorist struggle on 
their own. As limitations of armed struggle became clear in the 1980’s, Palestinians 
moved in the direction of mass rebellion. By the early 1990’s, this rebellion was slowed 
substantially by the promise of a peace process. The failure of this process soon re-
ignited a new wave of violence and terrorism.  
 
The First Phase: 1948-1967 
 
In the period immediately following their diaspora, Palestinian intellectuals 
believed that the remedy for their plight rested on Arab unity. Some discussed 
modernization as a prerequisite to unity. 12 As one author put it, Arab leaders “showed 
naivete’ in politics” and “weakness in diplomacy.” 13 
 
To bring about modernization and unity, many Palestinians felt that the first step 
would be to change the traditional leadership, whom they felt had betrayed their cause. In 
July, 1951, a Palestinian Arab assassinated King Abdullah of Jordan in Jerusalem. The 
assassination was in reaction to the general feeling among many Palestinians that the 
King had betrayed the Palestinian cause. Also, most Palestinians hailed the overthrow of 
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King Farouk of Egypt in 1952 and became the most enthusiastic supporters of Egypt’s 
revolutionary leader, Gamal Abdul Nasser. 
 
Nasser championed the cause of Arab unity. His call for an Arab summit in 1964 
led to the decision to establish a Palestinian organization. The early phase of the Palestine 
Liberation Organization under Ahmad Shukairy emphasized Arab joint efforts as it did 
the Arab character of Palestine.   
 
In this phase, therefore, Palestinian political culture was shocked by what they 
called “the tragedy” and looked for its causes. The other, rather than the self, was viewed 
as the culprit. The weak Arab order became the focus of Palestinian detestation. 
Remedies to this weak order rested with the Arabs. Salvation, therefore, awaited the 
reordering of Arab political affairs. The hope for return to their homes and lands from 
which they were dispossessed became a dream as it was an obsession. In time, the 
mystique of return became the single most important characteristic of Palestinian political 
culture. More than a bit ironic, then, was the fact that just as Zionism was achieving its 
zenith, a “Palestinian Zionism” was being born. Just as early Zionists looked for outside 
powers to help them bring about their version of “The Return,” Palestinians at this early 
stage looked for help from the Arab governments. In time, especially after 1967, the 
Palestinians lost hope in being able to achieve their goals through the Arab states, and felt 
that their only recourse was self-reliance through revolutionary violence and guerilla 
warfare. Thus, by the end of 1967 Palestinian political culture had entered its second 
phase. 
 
The Second Phase: 1967-1987 
 
The war of 1967 brought about a reawakening among the Palestinians. The Arabs, 
they learned, are unable to bring about their “Return.” The speedy and devastating defeat 
of the combined forces of Egypt, Syria and Jordan left most Palestinians in shock. In six 
days, Israel had quadrupled its size and came to occupy the remainder of Palestine 
(Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza) as well as lands from neighboring Arab states (the 
Golan Heights and Sinai Peninsula). More than a third of the Palestinians were now faced 
with the enemy as their occupying master. During the earlier phase, Palestinian political 
culture was characterized by its emphasis on the lost homeland and the dream of 
“Return.” It was alienation from the homeland that gave Palestinians their most powerful 
common cultural bond, reinforcing the belief that Israel was responsible for the brunt of 
Palestinian suffering.  
 
After the defeat of 1967, Palestinians began to combine their longing for the 
“Return” with emphasis on the maintenance of their identity. Thus, Palestinian 
nationalism began to replace the traditional Arab nationalism, which dominated 
Palestinian political culture prior to 1967. This emphasis on identity was necessitated by 
the war and its consequences. The 1967 war was an Arab-Israeli war in which the 
Palestinian dimension was almost totally absent. Israel, for the first time, came to occupy 
lands from neighboring Arab states. These states now had a new priority regarding Israel: 
the liberation of lost lands. The U.N. Security Council Resolution addressing the war and 
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the resolution of the conflict (242) advocated an exchange of occupied land for peace. 
The resolution has been criticized because it makes no mention of the Palestinian people 
except as refugees, and fails to make any reference towards a Palestinian state. Israeli 
leaders were boldly denying the existence of a Palestinian people as in the case of Mrs. 
Golda Meir’s infamous speech of 1969. In it, she said: “It was not as though there was a 
Palestinian people in Palestine considering itself as Palestinian people and we came and 
threw them out and took their country away from them;” the Israeli Prime Minister after 
1967 proclaimed, “They did not exist.” 14 In addition, Israeli occupation authorities were 
busily strangulating Palestinian expression in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 
Together, these activities prompted Palestinians everywhere to emphasize their own 
identity.  
 
Emphasis on Palestinian national identity required alternative means for the 
liberation of the lost homeland. If dependence on the Arabs was no more an avenue, then 
a different one had to be found. For a decade earlier, small groups of Palestinians had 
already argued for guerilla warfare as the means for the weak Palestinians to struggle 
against the strong Israelis. Their calls, however, were mere whispers and Palestinians 
everywhere continued to look toward the Arabs for a solution. The shattering Arab defeat 
in 1967 radically affected perceptions of the Arabs and helped create the political 
atmosphere in which guerilla warfare became the preferred alternative means of 
liberation. Guerilla warfare and armed struggle had already been successfully practiced in 
Algeria and was being waged in Vietnam and other places with some success. With such 
vivid examples of weak peoples resisting seemingly invincible enemies, the Palestinian 
masses turned rapidly in that direction.  
 
The popularity of armed struggle was further reinforced after the Battle of 
Karameh in March of 1968. On March 21, 1968 Israel launched a massive attack on the 
town of Karameh in Jordan. The objective of the Israeli incursion was to root out 
Palestinian commandos who made Karameh into a major center for training and 
launching attacks against it. Although the commandos, assisted by Jordanian forces, were 
outnumbered and suffered heavy casualties, they inflicted severe losses on the Israeli 
forces and were able to force the invaders to retreat. Pictures of burnt out Israeli tanks 
and captured Israeli soldiers in newspapers and on television screens gave the 
commandos a major boost. Just months after Israel defeated the combined forces of 
Jordan, Syria and Egypt, few armed commandos were able to inflict damage and “defeat” 
Israel in battle. Although hardly a military victory, the battle of Karameh was a major 
psychological victory for the notion of armed struggle. The ranks of the commandos 
swelled rapidly, and their popularity became ominous.  
 
Soon after Karameh, Palestinian political culture became characterized by its 
admiration of the commandos, known in Arabic as Fedayeen, or those who sacrifice 
themselves. Palestinian literature, art, songs, and media made the Fedayeen into 
legendary heroes. Palestinian hopes were now fixed on the commandos as if, in a 
miracuolous way, they will be able to transform these hopes into reality. The commandos 
“victory” against Israel, like the Vietnamese and Algerian victories, contributed to the 
Migration of Dreams through the growth of guerilla movements across national borders.  
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Consequently, the old pro-Arab leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO) was replaced in favor of commando leaders; armed struggle replaced Arab 
military cooperation as the means of liberation in the PLO’s charter. The very first 
incursion was carried out on January 1, 1965 when a Palestinian commando infiltrated 
into Israel and placed explosions that destroyed a section of the pipeline desined to divert 
the waters of the Jordan River into Israel. Since then, infiltrations continued and often 
targeted economic targets, including tourist buses. But Palestinian armed struggle had its 
limitations. Based in sovereign Arab states, it soon became obvious that Palestinian 
interests are not always compatible with the interests of their host states. In time, 
occasional clashes with Arab security forces gave way to full fledged civil wars which 
Palestinian commandos were destined to lose.    
 
With every clash and every civil war, Palestinian nationalism was strengthened 
even though the commandos usually lost. By the early 1980’s, Palestinian commandos 
having been driven out of Jordan, faced fierce attacks by Lebanese army and militia units, 
and confronted occasional Syrian onslaughts. Yet, their guerilla incursions into Israel 
continued. It was these incursions that brought upon the commandos the wrath of the 
Israelis. In June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon in order to drive the commandos out of the 
country. Palestinian steadfastness, patience and heroism were unable to reverse the 
inevitable. Israel’s occupation of south Lebanon, its siege of Beirut and its devastating 
and constant shelling of Lebanon’s capital including, “deliberate or indiscriminate or 
reckless bombardment of a civilian character, of hospitals, schools and other non-military 
targets” (15) for about three months forced the Palestinians to accept an internationally 
brokered agreement. Accordingly, the commandos were dispensed into other Arab states 
and the PLO headquarters were moved to Tunis. These developments led some 
Palestinians to question the viability of armed struggle as the major agent of liberation. 
This new mode became dominant by the end of 1987 with the start of the third phase: the 
Intifada.  
 
 
      The Third Phase: 1987-1993 
The Palestinian Intifada (uprising) was motivated by Israeli behavior as it was by 
commando failures. The dimmed hopes of liberation by Fedayeen coming from 
neighboring countries did entice many Palestinians to search for alternative means. This 
affected especially Palestinians living under Israel’s occupation and having to endure its 
hardships and witness its progress. 
 
While Israel’s victory over its Arab neighbors in 1967 provided it an opportunity 
to achieve a lasting peace in the area, Israel, instead, chose to establish its expansion of 
its sovereignty to include the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Contrary to the principles of 
international law, Israel set out to Judaize the areas. Doing so required the suppression of 
the very identity of the Palestinian people. Therefore, it was natural for Israel’s leaders to 
deny the very existence of the Palestinian people. Golda Meir’s infamous statement after 
the 1967 war that, “They did not exist,” was followed by Menachem Begin’s warning at a 
Kibbutz in 1969:  
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My friend, take care. When you recognize the concept of “Palestine,” you demolish your 
right to live in Ein Hahoresh. If this is Palestine and not the land of Israel, then you are 
conquerors and not tillers of the land. You’re invaders. If this is Palestine, then it belongs 
to a people who lived here before you came. 16  
 
 
The 1967 victory, therefore, was not a victory over another people but a war to 
“liberate” Israel’s lands. Israeli government publications assert, “in the course of the Six-
Day War new territories to the north, center, and south of the former boundaries of the 
State of Israel were liberated. 17 This attitude was strengthened with the assumption of 
the Likud to power in 1977. Menachem Begin, as Israel’s Prime Minister, was even more 
vehement in his rejection of reality when he said: “The term West Bank means nothing. It 
is Judea-Samaria. It is Israeli land belonging to Jewish people.” 18 
 
Israeli leaders would like the world to believe the land belongs to Israel, so that its 
inhabitants can be denied their national identity or the right, thereof, to express such 
identity. When one surveys the political motivation and Israel’s strangulation of 
Palestinian political expression, one concludes that Israeli policies and practices do 
perpetuate the denial of self-determination to the Palestinian people and an expansionist 
design aimed at securing a monopoly over the whole of geographic Palestine.  
 
Israel’s designed strangulation of Palestinian political expression reaches the 
entire sphere of political and cultural life. At the political level, all modes of conventional 
political participation were blocked. Political parties were banned, elections were halted, 
and all forms of political activity were made illegal and punished severely. Cultural 
strangulation, on the other hand, was manifested in restrictions on freedom of expression, 
repression of education, suppression of literature and art, and the curtailment of symbolic 
national expression.  
 
From the onset in 1967, Israel applied the Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 
1945 in order to have the legal empowerment to carry out its policy of securing 
sovereignty over the Occupied Territories and suppressing Palestinian national 
aspirations. The application of these regulations constitutes a clear violation of 
international law prohibiting the occupier from making even temporary changes in the 
law of government of the occupied area.  
 
The British Mandate government in 1945 introduced these regulations. Mr. Jacov 
Shimshon Shapira, who later became Israel’s Attorney General and Minister of Justice, 
attacked these same regulations, which he came to apply, as “uncivilized.” In 1946, Mr. 
Shapira said:  
 
The system established in Palestine since the issue of the Defence Laws is unparalleled in 
any civilized country; there were no such laws even in Nazi Germany. It is our duty to 
tell the whole world that the Defense Law passed by the British mandatory government 
of Palestine destroys the very foundation of justice in this land. 19 
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Justice, however, became less relevant to the Israeli Minister of Justice when the 
subjects were Palestinian Arabs. Consequently, Israeli suppression of Palestinian 
national, civil, and human rights go unquestioned by Israeli officials. In fact, there are 
very few provisions in the various international covenants on human and civil rights, 
which Israel has not violated repeatedly in its treatment of the population of the Occupied 
Territories. The life of every Palestinian living under Israel’s occupation has, therefore, 
been touched and made more difficult.  
 
Such practices as carrying identity cards, displaying different-color license plates, 
harassment at checkpoints, limitations on domestic and international travel, constructing 
a separation wall, and a host of other measures limiting personal and civil freedom have 
contributed to Israel’s attempts at strangulating Palestinian nationalist expression.  
 
In spite of all such attempts at obstructing Palestinian political expression under 
occupation, the Palestinians of the Occupied Territories have given birth to alternative 
methods of expression. Today, their message is clear. They want the fulfillment of their 
national aspirations to self-determination and the establishment of an independent 
Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. Their message, in practice, is a message of 
resistance to Israeli plans and of steadfastness on their land. This message has come 
across loud and clear since December 9, 1987 when the Palestinians in the Occupied 
Territories began their longest and most sustained Intifada (uprising) since Israel’s 
occupation began in 1967. This uprising represented an acceleration of an ongoing 
process of resistance. As such, it did not represent an interruption of an order as it did the 
culmination of an order. It represented a natural development. In reality, the uprising was 
the natural response to an unnatural occupation, an occupation that has been condemned 
repeatedly as a flagrant violation of international law. Far away from the events, people 
reacted with surprise, of shock; but there is nothing surprising or shocking about the 
refusal of a new generation of Palestinians to inherit pain and powerlessness or an old 
generation to accept the denial of their very existence as people.  
 
Within days from the start of the December 9, 1987 Intidada, the pro-PLO 
nationalist forces formed a joint command known as the United National Command for 
the Uprising (UNCU) and joined in Gaza by the new Islamic Jihad. Their leaflets, 
distributed clandestinely every other week or so, directed the masses and the support 
groups and put forth their message and demands. The leaflets, which have often been 
employed by the political forces, became the most powerful form of written political 
expression of the Palestinians under occupation. To those Palestinians, the leaflet was 
transformed into a sort of a bi-weekly constitution.  
 
Signed by the UNCU/PLO, it told people when to go to work and when to strike, 
when to demonstrate, break curfews, go to schools, visit families of those killed or 
imprisoned, and a host of other activities. The leaflets also directed the support groups 
and the masses to organize neighborhood committees for education, welfare, health, 
agriculture, and to guard their neighborhoods. The mass support the leadership received 
made the Palestinian Intifada a remarkable phenomenon in the history of the Palestinians 
and foiled Israel’s attempts at crushing it.  
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The leaflets have continuously asserted Palestinian demands to end the occupation 
and their right to self-determination. The link between the Palestinians under occupation 
and the PLO was emphasized in every leaflet and by the fact that the leaflets themselves 
were signed by the UNCU of the PLO. The so-called Jordanian option, whereby Israel 
negotiates the future of the territories with Jordan, was also condemned in the leaflets. 
The Palestinians clearly wanted nothing less than their independence. The Jordanian king 
subsequently declared the death of the Jordanian option when he severed Jordan’s 
administrative ties with the West Bank. By that time, however, the new administration 
had been in place. Popular committees were already running the new and clandestine 
apparatus of the Palestinians under occupation. As reported by John Kifner of the New 
York Times on May 15, 1988, “the Palestinians [had cut] themselves off from Israeli 
institutions and regulations. 20 
 
By then, the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories were, at the instructions of 
the UNCU, building self-sufficiency. Popular committees ran towns, villages, and 
refugee camps. Schools sprung up in homes, churches and mosques. Yards and vacant 
lots were being cultivated. Potential blood donors were classified by blood type to 
prepare for emergencies. Make shift clinics were created in camps, neighborhoods, and 
villages. Water wells were tested and treated as emergency water resources in case of 
Israeli cut off of the water supply. Landlords were forgiving rent payments. Security 
patrols with whistles and flashlights were set up to watch out for attacks by settlers and 
the army. Food supplies were also stored in almost every neighborhood. In sum, the 
Intifada was a clear manifestation of a social revolution that involved the entire 
Palestinian body politic. 21  
 
The Israelis were caught by surprise. Their leaders predicted the end of the 
Intifada in a matter of days. Defense Minister Rabin even refused to interrupt a visit to 
the United States at the start of the Intifada while assuring reporters that the uprising will 
die out in a matter of days. But the Intifada intensified, as did Israel’s repression. 
Consequently, Israel became polarized between those who argued for expulsion of the 
Palestinians and those who advocated the end of the occupation. But almost all Israelis, 
as evidenced by the statements of their leaders and the media, came to the conclusion that 
a return to the pre-Intifada status quo was impossible. Thus, as a form of political 
expression, the Intifada sent the Palestinian message to Israel, as did the world.  
 
The Intifada had the immediate effect of redrawing the border between Israel and 
the Occupied Territories. With Israel’s inability to put an early end to it, the Intifada gave 
the Palestinians a new sense of empowerment. Especially in the aftermath of its forced 
departure from Lebanon, the Palestinian leadership could now engage the Israelis in 
negotiations from a position of perceived power rather than defeat. The Intifada also 
forced the Israelis to rethink their position on the occupation itself. During the early years 
of the Intifada, Israel found itself occupying the West Bank and Gaza but unable to rule 
there. Soldiers had to be dispatched in large numbers and became entangled with an 
unarmed civilian population that had lost the element of fear. Pictures of Israeli armed 
soldiers shooting at Palestinian teenagers were not comforting to many Israelis. 
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Economically, the occupied areas also turned into a liability. Emotionally Israel found 
itself drained. In a short time, the occupation became a major issue polarizing Israel’s 
society as it did its body politique. 22 Consequently, Israel became more serious about 
finding alternatives to it occupation of the areas. Attention shifted towards establishing a 
Palestinian authority to administer the areas, while the land would remain effectively 
under Israeli control.  
 
Important to both the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships, was the rise of the 
Islamic movement under the banners of Hamas and Islamic Jihad. 23 While both of these 
groups existed in some form prior to the Intifada, the uprising gave them new life and 
many recruits. The leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization in Tunis feared 
their new found popularity and saw them as competitors for Palestinian leadership. The 
Israeli leaders, on the other hand, initially attempted to use these groups to further divide 
the Palestinians under its occupation. Within a year, however, Israeli leaders became 
alarmed at the pace of growth of Hamas and Islamic Jihad as they went about their daring 
attacks on Israelis. Their attacks often included suicide bombings where a belt of 
explosives wrapped around a volunteer who infiltrates into Israel and finds a crowded 
area to set the explosives off. Many of the volunteers are determined individuals who 
have some grievance. Take, for example, the case of Hanadi Jaradat. Hanadi carried out a 
suicide bombing at Maxim’s restaurant in Israel killing herself and 21 innocent victims. 
Hanadi was a well educated 29 year old attorney from the West Bank town of Jenin. Two 
weeks prior to her deadly attack, Israeli forces entered came to her family home looking 
for her brother. When located, her brother was shot and killed. Also killed in the attack 
was her fiancé. Both were killed while Hanadi watched. It was at that point that Hanadi 
approached Islamic Jihad activists to volunteer for the suicide bombing. Her subsequent 
action may have been motivated by revenge as much as it may have been by frustration. 
But her act led to the migration of Palestinian nightmares into Israeli society. 
 
In time, Israeli leaders came to the realization that such groups pose a greater 
danger to their security than does the PLO. In fact, the activities of such Islamic revivalist 
groups made the PLO leadership look moderate to many Israelis. As such, both the Israeli 
and Palestinian leaderships found in Hamas and the Islamic Jihad a new common enemy 
that needed to be controlled. Thus, both Israel and the PLO sought alternatives to the 
status quo.  
 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August of 1990 and the subsequent war against 
Iraq gave the PLO yet another incentive to join an American sponsored peace process. 
That war and its consequences contributed to the movement toward the peace process in 
many ways. First, the PLO found itself isolated form its financial benefactors in the Gulf 
and weakened diplomatically in its global relations. While the position of the PLO 
actually did not support the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, its opposition to the international 
campaign to end that occupation was perceived in many circles as supportive of Iraq. 24 
With the loss of Gulf funds, diplomatic setbacks and with more than 300,000 Kuwait 
Palestinians becoming dispossessed, the PLO became less able to help sustain the 
Intifada and began to look for alternatives. The peace process was such an alternative.  
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The Gulf War of 1991 had serious impact upon Israel as well. The war, in which 
Israel did not openly participate in, destroyed the Israeli sense of security through 
defensible borders. For the first time in the history of Arab-Israeli wars, Arab missiles 
rocked the heart of Tel Aviv, shattering the myth that the West Bank provided Israel with 
a deep defensible border. That long held Israeli argument for buffer zones came into 
question as Iraqi scud missiles crossed over Jordanian and West Bank territories to hit 
targets deep inside Israel. Moreover, the fear that Iraqi missiles could have carried 
chemical and biological agents and the psychological impact of the distribution of gas 
masks to every Israeli, made many Israelis aware that security is better provided through 
peace negotiations than the occupation of buffer zones.  
 
A third ramification of that war had to do with the United States. The U.S. effort 
to dislodge Iraq out of Kuwait was carried out under the banner of respect for 
international law and enforcement of United Nations Security Council resolutions. Such a 
position, though, had the effect of exposing a U.S. double standard. The Israeli 
occupation of Arab lands violated the same set of international laws elicited, over the 
years, in many UN Security Council resolutions. The American policy had consistently 
protected Israel from international sanctions and provided it with military and economic 
support in order “to ensure Israeli military superiority over any combination of Arab 
states.” 25 In order to maintain an Arab alliance against Iraq, the U.S., consequently 
promised to tackle the issue of Israeli occupation soon after the liberation of Kuwait. 
Coupled with the demise of the Soviet Union soon after the war, the U.S. commitment to 
settling the Arab-Israeli conflict became vital.  
 
The Fourth Phase: The “Peace Process” and Terrorism 
 
Recent years have seen a focus upon what is referred to as the peace process, 
between Israel and the Palestinians of the Occupied Territories. While such initiatives 
such as the Oslo Accords and the Camp David Accords, and most recently, the Bush 
Administration’s Road Map to Peace have all been treated as “fair deals” for both Israelis 
and Palestinians, the reality surrounded the “peace process” is radically different. Neither 
Oslo nor Camp David included any specific timetable for the creation of a sovereign 
Palestinian state. The “Road Map for Peace” requires Palestinians to “undertake an 
immediate cessation of violence” (26) before the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state 
will be considered, something no Palestinian leader can promise or enforce (all acts of 
terrorism cannot be prevented even under an authoritarian state). Neither Oslo, nor Camp 
David, nor the Road Map proposed a total end to the illegal Israeli settlements in the 
West Bank either, some discussed a halt to further construction only. It is interesting 
then, that the “Peace Process” contains none of the necessary components to actually 
promote a lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians.  
 
The “Road Map for Peace” is the most important of “peace” initiatives today, as it 
has been heralded as the new “solution” to the Israeli Palestinian conflict. The Road Map, 
along with the most recent plans of Israeli leaders, provides no requisites for a truly 
sovereign or meaningful state. As mentioned, the majority of Israeli settlements in the 
West Bank will not be dismantled. These settlements and the highways connecting them 
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run throughout the entirety of the West Bank. The settlements threaten to divide the 
entire country into separate districts, with no way to travel from one to another without 
going through Israeli checkpoints. Furthermore, Ariel Sharon’s plan for a Palestinian 
“state” will not include a Palestinian army, or Palestinian control over its border and 
airspace. Israel will also continue with the building of the wall deep into the West Bank, 
threatening to further segregate the Palestinian people into concentration camp style 
confinement. It becomes increasingly obvious by looking at these characteristics for the 
Palestinian “state,” that the Palestinians are being offered less than any rational human 
should accept. The creation of such a Palestinian “state” would be nothing more than a 
joke – a state by name, but an occupied territory under Israeli jurisdiction and assault. Far 
from a plan for peace, the Road Map is a recipe for the indefinite subordination of the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the maintenance of permanent Israeli territorial 
jurisdiction over those territories. The peace process has been criticized so strongly 
because it does not adequately deal with many of the Palestinian demands at the heart of 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – a mandatory and permanent withdrawal of Israeli troops 
from Gaza and the West Bank, a guarantee for the creation of a sovereign Palestinian 
state in the near future, and the dismantlement of all the illegal Israeli settlements in the 
Occupied Territories. Without the fulfillment of these demands, it is unlikely that 
Palestinian or Israeli terrorist attacks will end in the foreseeable future. 
 
The Israeli plan for permanent control of the Gaza Strip and West Bank should 
not be considered that controversial considering the incriminating statements of Israeli 
leaders themselves. Former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu argued in his book, A 
Place Among the Nations, for the permanent subjugation of the Gaza Strip and West 
Bank under Israeli dominance. 27 Former Prime Minister Menachem Begin, as already 
highlighted, claimed that the West Bank did not exist, while the Peres-Shamir Coalition 
government added that no “additional Palestinian state,” would be allowed to exist in the 
region (28)  – Jordan supposedly being the first Palestinian state. Former Prime Minister 
Rabin said of the Palestinians, “The inhabitants of the Occupied Territories are subject to 
harsh military and economic pressure,” alluding to his final promise, that “in the end, 
they (Palestinians) will be broken.” 29 Israel’s current Prime Minister, Erik Sharon, has a 
long history of support for settlement activities as well. 
 
Terrorism in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 
 
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been characterized by terrorist atrocities 
committed by both sides. These terror attacks demonstrate the full viciousness that 
accompanies the Migration of Nightmares between nations. 
Palestinian terrorism, often taking the form of suicide bombings, has caused 
considerable destruction. Suicide bombings have incited fear and uncertainty in the minds 
of Israelis throughout the Occupied Territories and in Israel itself. Suicide bombings 
create so much fear because of their random nature, in effect, all Israelis are terrorized by 
the fear they could lose their lives at any time. The stories of Moti Mizrachi and Daniel 
Turjeman indicate the dangers that Israelis face every day from suicide bombings. 
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Mizrachi and Turjeman were attacked in a Jerusalem café in March of 2002, injured by a 
suicide bombing. Mizrachi’s and Turjeman’s stories reveal the brutality of such attacks. 
Mizrachi explains: “There was an explosion. I fell to the floor. After a few seconds, I 
woke up. Everything around was torn apart. There was blood, body parts, people – water 
squirting from the ceiling, maybe from a burst pipe. I picked myself up to get help. I was 
bleeding heavily.” Shrapnel barely missed Mizrachi’s aorta, but left his left hand nearly 
severed. Mizrachi also suffered shrapnel wounds to his head. Mizrachi’s hand, although 
now reattached, is held together by pins; he suffers tremendous pain and must make 
frequent visits to the hospital. Mizrachi’s reaction is instructive in explaining the fear that 
Israelis bear: “One quick minute and everything is radically changed. It’s like your life 
was erased – everything that you did vanished into nothing. I used to be active, to play 
soccer two or three times a week, I was on teams, I danced.” Turjeman describes his 
experiences that day: “…everything exploded. I flew twenty meters from the blast, 
literally across the road, and fell onto the street. I lost consciousness and came to after a 
few minutes. There was screaming and ambulances. I felt that my arm was not connected 
to my body. It was barely connected to my shoulder. The friend who had invited me that 
evening came looking for me. He saw immediately that my arm was a mess. I also held 
one eye closed because it was full of metal. He asked me what was in his eye. I didn't 
want to tell him that his eye was hanging out, attached by just a few ligaments. It makes 
me sick to remember this.” Altogether eleven Israelis were killed in this attack; over fifty 
were seriously injured. Sadly, this bombing was only one of forty-eight suicide bombings 
against Israeli civilians between January 1, 2001 and August 31, 2002. 30  
The suicide bombings committed against Israeli civilians have been rightly 
condemned in the American mass media. Unfortunately, acts of Palestinian terror, such 
as in the example above have been focused upon to the exclusion of Israeli terrorist 
attacks. Israeli state terror, committed against the Palestinians, as well as in retaliation for 
Palestinian attacks, has been tremendous. During the second Intifada, Israeli murder has 
been considerable in cities like Beit Jala, a Christian Palestinian town just south of 
Jerusalem. The area came under heavy rocket and artillery fire by the Israeli Defense 
Forces (IDF) in response to purported Palestinian small-arms fire. Raphaella Fischer’s 
story shows the despair that has been wrought upon Palestinian cities by the Israeli 
military. Fischer describes the day her father was killed by the reckless Israeli shelling of 
their town: “Looking back at the day when my father was taken away, I remember feeling 
that my soul was leaving to another zone. For some reason I couldn’t understand, I felt 
like the whole world was going to end, so I screamed and felt I was going to die. In 
reality, a part of me is now missing and I’m cracked up with my misery.” 31 Israeli 
crimes committed during the second Intifada were far from isolated incidents. Eyewitness 
accounts of the 2002 Israeli invasion of the West Bank implicate the Israeli army in the 
summary executions of Palestinian citizens. Sanna al-Sadi, widower to one of those 
executed in Jenin recalls the incident: “My husband (Abdelkarim Yusuf al-Sadi) and I 
had a very happy life together, although it was cut too short. During the invasion, I was at 
my in-laws’ house with my husband. We were all sitting together as the area was being 
shelled by the Israelis. We constantly tried to comfort each other. During the first day, I 
spent time trying to cheer everyone up. Our neighbors escaped to our house when the 
shells destroyed their home. Israeli soldiers came and blasted open the back gate. The 
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Israelis stormed in. Abdelkarim my husband, Waddah al-Shalabi, our neighbor and his 
father were ordered to stand outside near a wall. They were ordered to lift up their arms 
while facing the wall. As they did so, the soldiers opened fire to execute all three of them. 
We knew that these three men had nothing to do with the resistance. We did not expect 
that they would be executed. I started screaming at the top of my lungs. “They have died, 
they have been martyred!” My husband was so innocent. He never hurt anyone. I was so 
terrified and humiliated. I immediately felt like I wanted to avenge my husband.” 32  
Israeli terrorism has taken a substantial toll on the people of Gaza and the West 
Bank. All told, as many as 390 Palestinian men, women, and children died from Israeli 
repression during the initial year of the First Intifada (1987), and more than two thousand 
during the Al-Aqsa (Second) Intifada – a significant portion of both being civilian 
casualties. 33 The stories of the victims of Israeli-Palestinian terror reinforce the brutality 
of the Migration of Nightmares over national boundaries. Terrorist attacks like those 
committed by Palestinian suicide bombers and by the Israeli military reveal the suffering 
and emotions on both sides of the conflict that fuel the cycle of violence. These stories 
also substantiate the notion that such terrorist attacks are an ineffective way of increasing 
Israeli and Palestinian security. 
        Motivations for Israeli and Palestinian Terrorism 
While terrorists do commit crimes against humanity, the official reason is usually 
of retaliation, condemnation, investigation, and denunciation; there is usually little 
inquiry by government officials into why individuals or groups carry out such acts. It is 
hard to imagine a solution to a problem without addressing its root causes. Doing so 
would be like a doctor sewing a wound with an infection still flaring on the inside. It is 
this issue that we must turn to now. 
The arguments in this book indicate that Israeli terrorism in Gaza and the West 
Bank has been conducted under the motivation of permanently subjugating these 
Occupied Territories under Israeli jurisdiction and control. Little else would describe 
Israel’s continued and stubborn occupation of Palestinian lands for three and a half 
decades, in clear defiance of international law, and at great cost to Israel and Palestinian 
security and human rights. The refusal to remove Israeli settlements, Prime Minister 
Sharon’s wall within the West Bank, the damning statements of Israeli leaders 
condemning Palestinian rights, and the withholding of any substantive Palestinian state 
and necessary state sovereignty from the Palestinian people all indicate that Israel is not 
interested in a peaceful solution to this terrorist conflict. The continued use of violence in 
the attempt to destroy the Palestinian Intifadas confirms Israel’s commitment to 
destroying any chance of Palestinian independence from foreign influence. 
Palestinian terrorism against Israeli civilians is very likely of a different nature. 
While suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks are, at times, the product of the power 
struggle between organizations like Hamas and Islamic Jihad and the state of Israel, 
Palestinian terrorist attacks (suicide bombings) are often a result of desperation. As Sanna 
al-Sadi (above) explained in regards to her husband’s death: “I was so terrified and 
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humiliated. I immediately felt like I wanted to avenge my husband.” 34 Sanna’s reaction 
is enlightening in that it helps explain the motivations behind prospective terrorists with 
nothing left to lose. How many other Palestinian men, women and children have suffered 
the fate of Sanni? How many of them are willing to take out their anger and frustration on 
Israeli civilians and military targets? As the persistence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
demonstrates, so long as Israeli leaders find it necessary to continue their occupation and 
human rights abuses, the victims of those abuses will be ready to retaliate.  The story of 
Hanadi Jaradat who lost her brother and her fiancé before she turned into a suicide 
bomber is a reminder that the cycle of terror rarely begins with one individual terrorist. 
 
Globalization and Domination: Putting the Israeli-Palestinian    
  Conflict into Proper Context 
 
An analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would not be complete without 
discussion of the U.S. role in supporting Israeli atrocities. The American mass media has 
done an excellent job of burying and censoring Israeli terrorism, thereby erasing 
American responsibility for Israel’s actions. For those that look beyond the U.S. media, 
the picture that emerges is quite clear. The leading recipient of American foreign aid is 
Israel, receiving more than three billion dollars a year. U.S. aid to Israel goes, among 
other things, to the purchase of American military weapons – including tanks, 
helicopters, F-16 fighters, machine guns and bullets. These weapons are used repeatedly 
in Israeli human rights abuses committed against Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. 
U.S. aid also goes to protecting thousands of Israeli settlers living illegally in Gaza and 
the West Bank. It would be difficult, if not impossible for the Bush Administration, or 
past Administrations to argue that they are not aware of Israeli human rights abuses. This 
would mean that American leaders have continued their support of Israel despite its 
crimes. 
Explanations for American support for Israel vary. However, if one is to accept 
the seriousness of Israeli terrorism committed in the Occupied Territories, then it is 
difficult to escape the conclusion that the Israeli assault serves some sort of geopolitical 
realist American interest. This would not be the first time that the U.S. has used client 
regimes with dismal human rights records to further its political interests. Proponents of 
this explanation maintain that American support for Israel, coupled with support for 
Saudi Arabia, and now Iraq, reinforce American hegemony in the Middle East and 
control of strategic economic resources. Such critics cite American military presence 
throughout the world, unprecedented in world history until now, to substantiate the 
existence of American empire. If the realist explanation of American support for Israel is 
true, it may mean the indefinite Migration of Nightmares from the U.S. to the Occupied 
Territories in the form of Israeli repression. The consequences include a counter 
Migration of Nightmares from the Palestinian grim reality to Israel and its benefactor. 
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  Signs of Hope: The Globalization of Nonviolence  
in the Occupied Territories 
The use of nonviolent tactics as seen in the First and Second Intifada is 
encouraging for those who support a nonviolent solution to the American-Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. The Migration of Dreams through the globalization of nonviolent 
resistance to government repression is now evident, including Gandhi in India, the Civil 
Rights Movement in the United States, the non-violent resistance to South African 
apartheid, and now with the Intifadas in the Occupied Territories. Palestinian successes 
with the use of nonviolence may lead to considerable gains for the Palestinian people. 
The use of nonviolence may be essential in changing world opinion (particularly in the 
United States) concerning the nature of the Israeli occupation. Success may also help in 
removing Israeli leaders justification for use of force in the Gaza Strip and the West 
Bank. Nonviolent tactics may help in bringing about an end to the cycle of violence, and 
may help remove the justification in the minds of Israelis and those throughout the world 
who believe that Israeli repression is a legitimate means of “self-defense.” Furthermore, 
success in any of these areas will be necessary in order to make any significant progress 
towards the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state. 
  
Just like with terrorism, both Israelis and Palestinians have carried out non-violent 
action.  Some Israelis have even refused military service in Gaza or the West Bank in 
objection to the occupation, preferring jail to service. Some Palestinians and international 
supporters have lost their lives demonstrating for an end to the occupation.  Many forms 
of nonviolent resistance have been practiced in opposition to Israel’s occupation and its 
behavior.  On December 28, 2003, Israeli Gil Na’amati, from Kibbutz Re’em in the 
Negev, was protesting with other Israelis, foreigners and Palestinians. They were making 
their opposition to the construction of the so called “security fence” known. When Israeli 
soldiers arrived at the scene, they opened fire. A number of demonstrators were injured. 
Among them was Gil who suffered serious injuries. Gil was not the first Israeli to suffer 
because of his opposition to the occupation, and, he will not be the last. But it is acts of 
courage like Gil’s along with international volunteers and Palestinian civilians that give 
us a glimpse of hope for the future. Perhaps, the nightmares of the day would be 
transformed into pleasant dreams of peace and reconciliation between Israelis and 
Palestinians. 
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